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ABSTRACT With the spread of Internet of Things’ (IoT) applications, security has become extremely
important. A recent distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack revealed the ubiquity of vulnerabilities
in IoT, and many IoT devices unwittingly contributed to the DDoS attack. The emerging software-defined
anything (SDx) paradigm provides a way to safely manage IoT devices. In this paper, we first present
a general framework for software-defined Internet of Things (SD-IoT) based on the SDx paradigm.
The proposed framework consists of a controller pool containing SD-IoT controllers, SD-IoT switches
integrated with an IoT gateway, and IoT devices. We then propose an algorithm for detecting and mitigating
DDoS attacks using the proposed SD-IoT framework, and in the proposed algorithm, the cosine similarity
of the vectors of the packet-in message rate at boundary SD-IoT switch ports is used to determine whether
DDoS attacks occur in the IoT. Finally, experimental results show that the proposed algorithm has good
performance, and the proposed framework adapts to strengthen the security of the IoT with heterogeneous
and vulnerable devices.
INDEX TERMS Software-defined Internet of Things (SD-IoT), distributed denial of service (DDoS), attack
detection, attack mitigation, cosine similarity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming more popular, and it
can be seen in the home, vehicles and wearable devices.
IoT involves a large number of interconnected devices,
including household appliances, public facilities, wearable
equipment, medical equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles,
and interconnected vehicles as well as other applications
that require networking [1]–[4]. In the next decade, tens
of billions of devices with a variety of vulnerabilities
will be connected to IoT. These networking devices have
no user interface, no security protocol, and no comput-
ing and storage capacity to enable firewalls and diagnostic
tools; moreover, they cannot directly connect to the Inter-
net via WiFi. These vulnerabilities represent temptation not
only for organizations that want to collect data to achieve
intelligent management and digital evidence but also for
those who want to disseminate DDoS attacks or other
malicious intrusions. Once a DDoS attack is success-
ful, it may threaten the safety of human life and even
directly or indirectly cause death and destruction. In recent
years, many examples have shown that IoT is vulnerable
to viruses [5], [6]. Recent DDoS attacks have revealed that
loopholes are ubiquitous in IoT, which is still in the ini-
tial stage. Without security precautions, the vast majority of
IoT devices may unknowingly become accomplices to
DDoS attacks.
The software-defined anything (SDx) paradigm addresses
the above mentioned problems. SDx includes software-
defined radio (SDR), software-defined networking (SDN),
software-defined data centers (SDDC), software-defined
infrastructure (SDI),and the software-defined world (SDW).
SDN is undoubtedly the most recognized technology, and its
core technology is the separation of the control plane and data
plane in the network. It realizes flexible control of network
traffic and provides a good platform for the innovation of core
networks and applications. For example, Huo et al. [7] and
Zhang et al. [8] focused on SDN for next-generation green
wireless networks and future 5Gwireless networks. Recently,
we analyzed computational diversity in emerging networking
paradigms, e.g., SDN, cloud radio access networks (C-RAN),
and mobile cloud computing (MCC) [9], and proposed a box-
covering-based routing algorithm for large-scale SDNs [10].
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Recent studies indicate that SDN support for IoT is
achieved through centralized control, abstraction of net-
work devices and flexible, dynamic and automated recon-
figuration of networks. The integration of SDN and IoT
is a potentially feasible solution to strengthen the manage-
ment and control capabilities of the IoT network [11]. For
instance, the software-defined Internet of Things (SD-IoT)
is favored in [12] and [13]. Liu et al. [14] proposed an
SD-IoT architecture for smart urban sensing. Xiong et al. [11]
proposed an SDN architecture for IoT and investigated the
resource allocation problem in the proposed SD-IoT network.
Kuang et al. [15] developed a transition tensor model for rout-
ing path recommendation by applying SDN technology to
IoT for device management. A model of the IoT architecture
that combines the benefits of SDN and fog computing has
also been presented [16]. Sood et al. [17] highlighted recent
significant developments in the wireless and optical domains
with the aim of integrating SDN and IoT; in addition, they
discussed challenges in SDN and IoT integration.
The key feature of SD-IoT is that it decouples network
control and forwarding functions. The SD-IoT controller
in the control layer is responsible for the logic centralized
control of IoT. The SD-IoT switches, e.g., two-layer or
three-layer switches, routers, base stations and wireless
access points, only act as the data layer of IoT, and they only
perform flow forwarding. Using a programming interface
(such as REST [18]) provided by the SD-IoT controller,
users can interact directly with IoT devices, configure the
edge computing, analyze the environment and deploy security
control. This decoupling avoids potential operation failure
and service interruption, ensures the continued availability
of IoT devices, prevents unauthorized access to peripheral
devices, monitors and controls changes to the Internet of
devices, detects legitimate and malicious traffic patterns on
IoT devices, and ultimately reduces the risks managed by
IoT security [19]–[21].
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, Bawany et al. [22] studied and proposed a frame-
work for large-scale networks such as smart cities for DDoS
attack detection and mitigation based on the SDN architec-
ture. Lim et al. [23] proposed a scheduling-based architecture
for the SDN controller that leads to effective attack con-
finement during DDoS attacks. Vizvary and Vykopal [24]
summarized the execution, detection and mitigation of DDoS
attacks in the SDN environment. Wu et al. [25] investigated a
flow rule flooding DDoS attacks, and studied a novel DDoS
attack targeting the data plane of SDN. Dayal et al. [26]
summarized existing solutions to the DDoS problem of SDN
and roughly divided them into three types: statistic-based
approaches, rule-based approaches, and machine-learning
approaches. Statistic-based approaches use statistical
methods to analyze the SDN network traffic to achieve
a distinction between normal flow and DDoS flow.
Mousavi and St-Hilaire [27] proposed an entropy-based
DDoS attack detection algorithm using the statistic-based
approach. The algorithm calculates the entropy of the desti-
nation IP address in the packet-in message through the SDN
controller and selects the threshold and sampling time. The
DDoS attack can be considered detectedwhen the value of the
entropy is greater than the given threshold. It can detect DDoS
attacks but cannot locate the specific IP address. Rule-based
approaches extract the features of different DDoS attacks
and then exchange these features at the flow table to avoid
DDoS attacks [28]. The benefit of rule-based approaches
is that they have relatively high accuracy, but the disad-
vantage is that features must be re-extracted when new
attack modes emerge. Machine-learning approaches use the
machine to learn, following by training according to the SDN
in the flow characteristics of the sample to obtain the best
learning model. Kokila et al. [29] used support-vector net-
works (SVM) to detect DDoS attacks. In [30], a DDoS attack
detection algorithm of SDN devices based on IP filtering was
proposed. For convenience, we call it the DPPC algorithm.
The DPPC algorithm is simple to implement but cannot
cope with the requests of large traffic. More importantly,
the DPPC algorithm divides the DDoS packets based on
IP address, which is affected by forged source IP addresses.
A backtracking algorithm must be introduced to find a real
DDoS source, which will increase the response time. Other
works on DDoS attacks in SDN can been found in [31]–[33].
Previous findings indicate that SDN technology can help
enterprises resist DDoS attacks, and Wang et al. [34] pro-
posed a DDoS attack mitigation architecture that is suitable
for a cloud computing environment. The architecture inte-
grates a highly programmable network and a flexible control
structure, where the programmable network is responsible for
monitoring and detecting attacks, and the control structure
is responsible for the rapid response to attacks. The cur-
rent situation and progress of DDoS attack mitigation based
on SDN in a cloud computing environment can be found
in [35] and [36].
There is preliminary research on how to strengthen and
enhance the security of the IoT with SDN technology.
Flauzac et al. [19] proposed a secure and distributed
architecture for IoT based on the SDN domain. Recently,
Li et al. [20] investigated the potential threats of man-
in-the-middle attacks on the OpenFlow control channel.
Ahmed and Kim [21] conducted a preliminary discussion
of the mitigation of DDoS attacks in IoT and attempted
to use the SDN architecture to mitigate the sampling-based
anomaly detection system constraints to collect traffic statis-
tics in the SDN switches and achieve detection accuracy.
Nguyen and Yoo [37] proposed a hybrid countermeasure
to prevent link spoofing attacks in the SD-IoT controller.
Ge et al. [38] developed two proactive defense mechanisms
for SD-IoT with non-patchable vulnerabilities.
Research on integrating SDN and IoT networks is still
in its infancy. Many problems remain open, e.g., network
framework and security. In this paper, we study DDoS attack
detection and mitigation in our proposed SD-IoT framework.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
VOLUME 6, 2018 24695
D. Yin et al.: DDoS Attack Detection and Mitigation With SD-IoT Framework
FIGURE 1. SD-IoT framework.
• A general framework for the SD-IoT is described, and
the proposed framework consists of a controller pool,
SD-IoT switches integrated with the IoT gateway, and
IoT devices. The controller pool is designed as a vertical
control structure, including the main control layer and
basic control layer.
• An algorithm for detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks
with the SD-IoT framework is proposed based on the
cosine similarity of the vectors of the packet-in rate at the
port of the boundary SD-IoT switches, and the threshold
value of the cosine similarity and length of the vectors
are obtained.
• The simulation results show that the proposed algorithm
can find the IoT device from which a DDoS attack
is launched within a shorter time period; the proposed
approach quickly manages and mitigates the DDoS
attack in IoT.
This paper is organized as follows. We summarize related
work and the main contributions of this paper in Section II.
In Section III, we introduce the general framework for
SD-IoT, present the structure of the controller pool, and
describe the problem of DDoS attacks in IoT. We propose an
algorithm for detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks based
on the proposed SD-IoT framework in Section IV. Section V
presents the experimental settings and evaluates the perfor-
mance. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VI.
III. DDoS ATTACKS IN THE SD-IoT ENVIRONMENT
The SDx paradigm uses software to control various types
of hardware. SDN is one of the most extensive applications
of the SDx paradigm and one of the most important areas
in software-defined technology. The devices in SDN are
programmable, and thus the networks themselves are
more dynamic, manageable, cost-effective, and adaptable.
SDN decouples the data plane and control plane. The primary
components of SDN [39] are controllers and switches. The
controllers in SDN are in charge of the management of the
entire network, and the switches in SDN are responsible for
network traffic forwarding based on the instructions deployed
through the SDN controllers. SDN strives to be suitable to
the changing traffic patterns, high-bandwidth, and dynamic
nature of today’s applications, and it is an emerging technol-
ogy that can provide security defense solutions because it is
capable of detecting attacks [39]. Recent studies indicate that
SDN is regarded as a critical enabler of the security defense
of IoT [19]–[21]. SDN can simplify IoT’s plug-and-play pre-
defined policies for network devices, automatically detect and
remedy security vulnerabilities, configure edge computing
and analyze the environment of the data flow.
A. SD-IoT FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe a general framework for
SD-IoT using the SDx paradigm, as illustrated in Fig.1. The
proposed SD-IoT framework can be seen as an extended
version of the SDN architecture applied to IoT, as well as
a general type of IoT architecture based on the SDN as
proposed in [13]. The framework can be divided into three
layers: the application layer, control layer and infrastructure
layer. The application layer consists of the IoT server in the
cloud computing center, which is connected to controllers
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FIGURE 2. Structure of the controller pool.
in the SD-IoT controller pool, and the IoT server provides
different applications and services via APIs. The control layer
consists of a controller pool with many SD-IoT controllers,
which run a distributed operating system that provides a
logical centralized control and a topology view for IoT data
forwarding in a distributed physical network environment.
The infrastructure layer is composed of a mass of SD-IoT
switches. Every SD-IoT switch integrates the function of an
IoT gateway and an SDN switch, and each SD-IoT switch can
access different IoT actuating devices and sensing devices,
such as cameras, digital cameras, smart phones, and per-
sonal computers, by controlling the data plane interface. The
IoT gateway in the proposed SD-IoT framework is inte-
grated with the function of an SDN switch, whereas the
IoT gateway in the framework mentioned by Hakiri et al. [13]
is separate from the SDN switch. In addition, the proposed
SD-IoT framework adopts the SD-IoT controller pool, and
whereas the framework in [13] adopts a single controller.
B. STRUCTURE OF THE CONTROLLER POOL
In the above mentioned SD-IoT framework, the controller
pool is designed as a vertical control structure, as illustrated
in Fig.2. It is divided into two layers: the main control layer
and basic control layer. The main control layer interacts with
the application layer upwards and interacts with the basic
control layer downwards, and the basic control layer interacts
with the infrastructure layer.
Each controller of the main control layer, called the main
controller, manages some base controllers, whereas the other
basic controllers in the basic control layer are used as standby
control objects. The main controllers are responsible for
resource management, security and coordination of the basic
control layer and also offer a northbound interface for the
application layer services. In the main controllers, a Leader is
elected by using the Paxos algorithm to solve the consensus
problem. The Leader can obtain the global network topology
information, control the main controllers and coordinate the
basic controllers.
The basic controllers are responsible for resource manage-
ment and security in a domain of IoT, as shown in Fig.1.
IoT devices in the same domain can communicate through
the basic controller of the domain. Each switch connects a
master controller, and other controllers are known as slave
controllers. Two IoT devices in different domains commu-
nicate through the main controller. The basic controllers
FIGURE 3. The process of DDoS attacks in SD-IoT.
communicate with the switches of the infrastructure layer,
send packet-out messages to the switches at regular intervals,
and obtain information on the switches through feedback
packet-in messages. The basic controllers submit their own
control information by interacting with the main controllers
so that the main controllers can obtain the entire network
global view. The load balance of the entire IoT can be
improved through the coordination of messages in the main
controllers and by using the dynamic load-balancing algo-
rithm in the basic controllers [40].
The vertical structure of the controller pool is not only
easy to manage but also solves a series of problems
caused by the single point failure of the simple con-
troller, e.g., incompatibility in the underlying controllers,
load imbalance and message inconsistency between the main
controllers.
C. DDoS ATTACKS IN SD-IoT
A DDoS attack is a type of attack in which devices are
attacked frommultiple sources in a distributed manner, creat-
ing a denial of service to users. SDN offers defense solutions
for DDoS attacks through its programmability feature [39].
In the proposed SD-IoT framework, the SD-IoT controllers
in the controller pool of IoT are responsible for the logic
centralized control of the entire IoT environment. The logic
centralized control is easy to manage and configure but also
causes security issues. Similar to SDN, SD-IoT is capable
of offering constructive schemes for detecting and mitigat-
ing DDoS attacks through the programmability of the pro-
posed SD-IoT framework. In the following, we will analyze
the process of DDoS attacks in SD-IoT, as illustrated
in Fig. 3.
1) The DDoS attacker sends a new packet to a certain
SD-IoT switch, where the attack packet is generated by
the attack script.
2) If there is no corresponding match in the flow table
items of the SD-IoT switch, the SD-IoT switch will
encapsulate the header of the packet into a packet-in
message and send it to one controller of the controller
pool in SD-IoT.
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3) The SD-IoT controller unpacks the packet-in message
and generates a new flow table item, which is issued to
the SD-IoT switch.
When a DDoS attacker generates a large number of packets
withoutmatching, the SD-IoT controller in the controller pool
receives a large number of packet-in messages, which not
only occupy the network resources between the SD-IoT con-
troller and SD-IoT switch but also consume the CPU, mem-
ory and other resources of the SD-IoT controller, resulting in
increased delay and even downtime. In addition, new flow
table items are continually added to the SD-IoT switches,
and the SD-IoT switches cannot continue to manage the new
incoming packets when the number of flow table items in
the SD-IoT switches exceeds the maximum. As a result,
the SD-IoT switches cannot work properly. This process is
similar to [41].
IV. DDoS ATTACK DETECTION AND MITIGATION
ALGORITHM
A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In the proposed SD-IoT framework, when an SD-IoT device
is attacked by a DDoS attacker, the attacker generates and
sends data packets consisting of randomly forged sources and
random destination addresses via script. To perform DDoS
attack detection and mitigation of SD-IoT devices, the pro-
posed algorithm calculates the cosine similarity of the vectors
of the packet-in rate for each port of the boundary switches in
the SD-IoT and then determines whether a DDoS attack has
occurred based on the value of the cosine similarity. First,
most of the packets sent by a DDoS attack are generated
through a programming method, and thus the rate at which
an attacker sends a DDoS packet can be considered stable and
relatively smooth in milliseconds. Then, when one of the data
packets in the SD-IoT switch has no corresponding match to
flow table items, the header of the data packet is encapsulated
into a packet-in message and sent to the SD-IoT controller,
and the packet-in message records which port of which
SD-IoT switch the message was sent from. In the physical
network, each boundary switch in SD-IoT is connected to
the only host, and thus the boundary switch is not affected
by the fake source IP address and destination IP address
when finding the real DDoS attack source. We will design the
algorithm for detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks with the
proposed SD-IoT framework in the next subsection.
B. ALGORITHM DESIGN
The key of the proposed algorithm is the introduction of
cosine similarity for measuring the similarity between the
vectors with respect to the packet-in rate of the input port of
the boundary SD-IoT switches. In this subsection, the main
steps of the proposed algorithm for detecting and mitigating
DDoS attacks are as follows:
1) OBTAINING THE VECTORS X AND Y OF THE INPUT
PORT RATE λm
At a time interval 1t , we first obtain the packet-in rate λm
(m = 1, 2, . . .) of the input port α of the boundary SD-IoT
switch, and then we obtain the set X = {X1,X2, . . . ,Xn} =
{λ2, λ4, λ6, . . . , λ2k}, Y = {Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yn} = {λ1,
λ3, λ5, . . . , λ2k−1}, where k represents the length of the
sets or vectors X and Y . In the following subsection, we will
discuss the selection of the k value in detail.
2) CALCULATING THE COSINE SIMILARITY ρX ,Y OF
THE VECTORS X AND Y
Cosine similarity is a measure of similarity between two
vectors. Cosine similarity is very efficient, particularly for
sparse vectors, because only the non-zero dimensions need
to be considered. We can obtain the cosine similarity ρX ,Y of
the vectors of the packet-in rate of the port α by the following
equation (1):
ρX ,Y = cos(θ )
= X • Y||X || × ||Y ||
=
∑n
i=1(Xi × Yi)√∑n
i=1 X2i ×
√∑n
i=1 Y 2i
=
∑2k
i=2m,j=2m−1(λi × λj)√∑2k
i=2m λ2i ×
√∑2k−1
j=2m−1 λ2j
(1)
where m = 1, 2, . . . , k . Obviously, all elements of the two
vectors X and Y are greater than or equal to 0, and thus we
have 0 ≤ ρX ,Y ≤ 1. If the cosine similarity ρX ,Y is closer
to 1, the closer the angle of the two vectors is, the closer the
two vectors X and Y are. If the cosine similarity ρX ,Y is equal
to 1, the similarity between vectors X and Y is highest.
3) DETERMINING WHETHER A DDoS ATTACK OCCURS
We assume that the threshold value of the cosine similarity
for distinguishing a DDoS attack flow and a normal flow
is ηU . If ηU ≤ ρX ,Y ≤ 1, the input port of the SD-IoT
switch may have a DDoS attack. If 0 ≤ ρX ,Y < ηU ,
the data packet of the port is likely to be a normal request.
The selection of the threshold ηU of the cosine similarity is
crucial for the performance of the proposed algorithm. In the
next subsection, we discuss the threshold ηU of the cosine
similarity in detail.
4) DISCARDING THE DDoS ATTACK PACKET
To improve the reliability and accuracy of the results, multiple
ρ valuesmust be sampled to distinguish the DDoS attack flow
and normal flow. We obtain the set P = {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρl},
where l is the number of the sample ρ. We use sum to denote
the number of samples ρ that meet the condition ηU ≤ ρ ≤ 1
in the set P; then, we can determine which port is attacked by
the DDoS attacker according to the value of sum and discard
the specific type of data packet at the port. The pseudocode
of the proposed algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
C. PARAMETER SETTING
The threshold ηU of the cosine similarity and length k of
the vectors X and Y are two important parameters of the
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FIGURE 4. The cosine similarity of the DDoS attack flow (red curve) and normal flow (blue curve).
proposed algorithm. If ηU is too high, many DDoS attack
packets will be determined as legal requests. If ηU is too
low, many normal packets will be considered DDoS attacks.
If the value of k is greater, the detection time is longer. This
can lower the performance of the IoT and even result in a
breakdown of the SD-IoT controllers and switches. If the
value of k is too small, it can reduce the accuracy of the
detection results and ultimately lead to a high error rate.
To obtain the best possible value of the cosine similarity ηU
and length k , we will perform a large number of experiments
and analyses. The experimental environment is detailed
in Section V.
1) THE THRESHOLD ηU OF THE COSINE SIMILARITY
In the experiment where the values of ηU and k are selected,
the time interval t0 for sending DDoS attack packets is ran-
dom and ranges from 0.005s to 0.05s, and the step size 1t0
is 0.005s. The time interval t1 for sending packets of normal
flow is in the range of 0.05s to 1s, and the step length 1t1
is 0.05s. When the value of k increases from 1 to 9, we can
obtain the influence of different k values on the cosine simi-
larity. For each k value, we continuously obtain 100 values
for cosine similarity, and we can then separately calculate
the mean and standard deviation of the cosine similarity. The
cosine similarities of the DDoS attack flow (red curve) and
normal flow (blue curve) are shown in Fig.4. According to the
statistical analysis of the data, k changes from 1 to 9, and the
FIGURE 5. The mean and standard deviation of the cosine similarity
under different length k of the vectors.
value of the cosine similarity is greater than or equal to 0.7.
Therefore, we select 0.7 as the value of the threshold ηU in
the next experiment.
2) THE LENGTH K OF THE VECTORS
The mean and standard deviation of the cosine similarity
between the DDoS attack flow and normal flow are shown
in Fig.5. When the value of the length k of the vectors X
and Y changes from 2 to 9, the mean of the cosine similarity
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Algorithm 1 DDoS Attack Detection and Mitigation
Algorithm for SD-IoT
Input: The set edgeSW_set of all boundary SD-IoT
switches, the number sum of samples ρ meeting the
condition, the length k of the vectors X and Y , the time
interval 1t , the number of packet-in messages pkin, and
the threshold ηU of the cosine similarity.
Output: The port ddosPort carrying out the DDoS attack
and being detected.
1: if α ∈ edgeSW_set then
2: j = 1
3: m = 1
4: s = 1
5: while m ≤ sum do
6: while j ≤ 2k do
7: for each 1t do
8: count = the number of pkin
9: λj = count/1t
10: end for
11: end while
12: X = {λi}, where i = 2, 4, 6, . . . , 2k
13: Y = {λj}, where j = 1, 3, 5, . . . , 2k − 1
14: Calculate ρX ,Y by Equ.(1)
15: if ηU ≤ ρX ,Y ≤ 1 then
16: s = s+ 1
17: end if
18: end while
19: if s = sum then
20: return α
21: end if
22: end if
of the DDoS attack flow is basically flat, and the change
is not obvious. A significant change occurs when the value
of k is between 1 and 2; when k = 1, each of the two
nonzero vectors X and Y has only one nonzero element.
Regardless of the value of the nonzero element, the value
of the cosine similarity is equal to 1, as calculated by the
Equ.(1). In addition, the mean of the cosine similarity of the
normal flow increases with the increase in the value of k .
In general, all of the changes are very small. When k = 1,
the standard deviation of the cosine similarity is the smallest
regardless of whether it is normal flow or DDoS attack flow.
When k = 2, the standard deviation of the cosine similarity
of the DDoS attack flow is maximum. The standard deviation
of the cosine similarity of the DDoS attack flow drops to the
lowest point at k = 5. There is a slight increase after k = 6
followed by another decreasing trend until k = 9, when the
standard deviation of the cosine similarity of the DDoS attack
flow attains the minimum. Here, we need to select the most
appropriate value of the length k of the vectors X and Y .
That is, we need to find the minimum standard deviation of
the cosine similarity of the DDoS attack flow. The standard
deviation of the cosine similarity of the DDoS attack flow is
similar from k = 6 to k = 9 than for k = 5, but the time
required for continuous sampling of 5 times ρ is longer than
that required when k = 5. In the case of k = 1, the standard
deviation of the cosine similarity of the DDoS attack flow
is smallest, but the value of k is too small, and there is a
large probability that continuous 5 times ρ is greater than
the threshold ηU for normal flow. Obviously, when k = 5,
the standard deviation of the cosine similarity of the DDoS
attack flow is small, and the amount of time consumed for
detection is reasonable. A complete detection takes only 5s.
Without loss of generality, we set the parameter k to 5 in the
follow-up experiment.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first configure the experimental envi-
ronment, and then elaborate the experimental method.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithm.
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
The hardware of the experimental environment for evalu-
ating the performance of the proposed algorithm consists
of two computers. One of them acts as a controller, and
we configure its settings as follows: i5 2.7GHz processor,
8G DDr3 1866GHz memory, 256GB PCIe-based flash stor-
age, 7200RPM 1T hard disk drive and killer E2200 gigabit
ethernet adapter. The other computer is used to simulate
different network topologies in IoT and is configured with
an i7 2.5GHz processor and 16G DDr3 memory; all other
configurations are the same as above. The network band-
width is 100Mbp/s. All software is deployed in the Virtu-
alBox virtual machine platform of the Windows 10 system,
and Ubuntu 16.0.4 LTS is installed in the virtual machine.
The essential tools of the experimental platform include
software-defined controllers, software-defined switches and
DDoS attack software. In particular, Floodlight deployed on
the OS X platform is used as the SD-IoT controller; Open
vSwitch is used as the SD-IoT switch; Mininet deployed on
Ubuntu 16.0.4 LTS is used to simulate the network topology
of the SD-IoT, and its API interface is used in development
and testing; these software products support OpenFlow 1.4.
In addition, the DDoS attack flow and normal flow are both
generated through the Scapy library of the python script. The
Scapy library is an interactive and powerful program that
developers can use to fake or parse the contents of the data
package and current network protocol. The Scapy library
supports real-time capture and generation of data packets.
The python script can simulate complex network opera-
tions through the Scapy library and also control the number
and rate of sending packets. In our experiments, the forged
source IP address, the random destination IP address and
destination IP address of the UDP packets are all gen-
erated and sent through the Scapy library of the python
script.
An instance of the SD-IoT topology generated based
on Mininet, is used to validate the proposed algorithm, as
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FIGURE 6. An instance of DDoS attack detection and mitigation for SD-IoT.
TABLE 1. List of experimental parameters.
illustrated in Fig.6. We can determine a controller from the
controller pool to manage a domain by using the method
in [40]. Without loss of generality, we randomly choose one
Floodlight from the controller pool as the current SD-IoT
controller and use ten Open vSwitches as SD-IoT switches,
which are referred to as S0, S1, . . . , and S9. These are
50 terminal devices of the IoT, and they are referred to
as H0, H1, . . . , and H49. A50 is a host. The experimental
network topology is shown in Fig.6. We deploy python script
in terminal device H15 and host A50 and take terminal device
H15 as a frequent-accessing legitimate user who randomly
sends requests to terminal devices H0, H1, . . . , and H49.
We take host A50 as a DDoS attacker, who randomly sends
data packets with the forged source IP address, the source
MAC address and destination IP address. The experimental
parameters are summarized in Tab.1.
B. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
The experimental method for detecting and mitigating DDoS
attacks based on the proposed SD-IoT framework is as
follows:
1) CONFIGURING THE SD-IoT SWITCHES
First, all flow table items in SD-IoT switches S0, S2, and
S9 are cleared. Then the time period t1 for sending the packet-
in message of the normal flow from normal user H15 is set to
random. For example, the value of t1 is from 0.05s to 10s,
and the time interval 1t1 is 0.05s. Finally, the destination
IP address of one of the terminal devices H0, H2, . . ., and
H49. The time period t2 of the packet-in message sent by
the DDoS attacker is set from 0.005s to 0.035s, and the time
interval 1t2 is 0.005s.
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FIGURE 7. The number of flow table items in SD-IoT switch S3.
2) DEPLOYING THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR
DETECTING AND MITIGATING DDoS ATTACKS ON
THE SD-IoT CONTROLLER
For the proposed algorithm, we first set the parameters
idle_timeout and hard_timeout of the flow table items of
the normal flow in the SD-IoT controller to 20s and 600s,
respectively. Once the DDoS attack is detected, idle_timeout
and hard_timeout are set to 300s and 600s, respectively.
Then, host A50 sends a DDoS attack packet, and ter-
minal device H15 sends the normal packet so that the
SD-IoT controller generates a flow table item for each packet;
the entire process lasts about 180s. We can use the same
approach for the DPPC algorithm in [30]; idle_timeout and
hard_timeout from flow table items of the SD-IoT controller
are set to 10s and 60s, respectively. Once the DDoS attack is
detected, we set idle_timeout and hard_timeout to 60s and
600s, respectively.
3) OBTAINING THE STATISTICS DATA
For the three types of conditions - our algorithm, the
DPPC algorithm and the raw data - the SD-IoT con-
troller separately counts the number of flow table items of
switch S3, the number of packet-in messages sent by SD-IoT
switch S3 to the SD-IoT controller, and the number of data
packages that the SD-IoT controller receives.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
In the following subsection, we analyze the number of flow
table items of the SD-IoT switches, the number of packet-
in messages sent by the SD-IoT switches to the SD-IoT
controller, and the number of data packets received by the
SD-IoT controller under the two algorithms and the raw data.
The impact of time on the number of flow table items
in SD-IoT switch S3 is shown in Fig.7. Three curves are
very steep and have the highest slope in the beginning
stages. For our algorithm, the DPPC algorithm and the raw
data, the number of flow table items increases from zero
to 218, 347, and 677, respectively. The curve of the raw
data that does not deploy a detection or mitigation algo-
rithm is basically stabilized after 20s, as we set idle_timeout
to 20s, and flow table items are automatically removed
when the time exceeds idle_timeout . Therefore, the flow
table items of SD-IoT switch S3 change slightly rather than
continuing to increase significantly, and the overall trend
is relatively stable. Similarly, for the results obtained by
using the DPPC algorithm in [30], its curve is also stable
after 10s since idle_timeout is set to 10s, but the number of
flow table items does not decrease after 20s. Therefore, the
DPPC algorithm has no practical effect in our experimental
environment; that is, no DDoS attacks are detected. The curve
of the results obtained by using our algorithm shows that the
increasing trend of flow table items within the time frame
of 5s to 10s is smaller than that from 0s to 5s. With our
algorithm, the packet is discarded if a DDoS attack is detected
after 5s, and thus SD-IoT switch S3 does not send the packet-
in message to the SD-IoT controller. However, since the
SD-IoT controller has a buffer for packet-in messages in
memory, it continues to process the packet-in message and
send flow table items to SD-IoT switch S3, but the number
of flow table items is less than it was between 0s and 5s. The
curve of flow table items in SD-IoT switch S3 is basically flat
between 10s and 20s; SD-IoT switch S3 discards the DDoS
attack packets, the SD-IoT controller does not receive a large
number of packet-in messages generated by DDoS attacks,
and flow table items are not issued to SD-IoT switch S3. After
20s, the curve begins to decline rapidly; we set idle_timeout
to 20s. Flow table items added between 0s and 20s are over-
time after 20s, and SD-IoT switch S3 automatically removes
them. The number of flow table items from SD-IoT switch
S3 continues to decrease and level off until SD-IoT switch
S3 only contains flow table items of the normal flow.
The impact of time on the number of packet-in messages
sent by SD-IoT switch S3 to the SD-IoT controller is given
in Fig.8. The number of packet-in messages sent by SD-IoT
switch S3 to the SD-IoT controller increases with time. The
three curves indicate a slower rate of growth for our algorithm
than that of the DPPC algorithm and the raw data. The rate
of growth for our algorithm is only 12.09 percent of that of
the raw data and 12.77 percent of that of the DPPC algorithm.
Our approach adds rules to flow table items and discards this
packet using our algorithm when a DDoS attack packet is
sent to a port. Therefore, SD-IoT switch S3 no longer needs
to send a large number of packet-in messages to the SD-IoT
controller. For the raw data or the DPPC algorithm in [30],
SD-IoT switch S3 still needs to send a large number of packet-
in messages to the SD-IoT controller, and therefore the slope
of the curves is very steep.
The impact of time on the number of data packets received
by the SD-IoT controller is given in Fig.9. The varying ten-
dencies of the rate of growth are all consistent with the rate
of growth of the packet-in messages sent by SD-IoT switch
S3 to the SD-IoT controller, as shown in Fig.8. The rate of
growth for our algorithm is only 12.55 percent of that of the
raw data and 13.83 percent of that of the DPPC algorithm.
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FIGURE 8. The number of packet-in messages sent by SD-IoT switch S3 to
the SD-IoT controller.
FIGURE 9. The number of data packets received by the SD-IoT controller.
Compared to the number of packet-inmessages in Fig.8, there
are larger rates of growth for data packets received by the
SD-IoT controller in Fig.9. The negligible difference is
caused by the forwarding rules and centralized control
scheme in SD-IoT.
The impact of time on the bandwidth of controller-switch
channels in SD-IoT is shown in Fig.10. For our algorithm,
the bandwidth of the controller-switch channels in SD-IoT
increases rapidly from 0s and 5s. SD-IoT switch S3 discards
DDoS attack packets when our algorithm deployed in the
SD-IoT controller detects DDoS attacks in 5s. Therefore,
SD-IoT switch S3 does not have to send a large number
of packet-in messages to the SD-IoT controller. The value
of data packets received by the SD-IoT controller gradually
drops to the lowest level until it is stable. The minor fluc-
tuations are a result of the normal flow not being blocked;
SD-IoT switch S3 still sends packet-in messages to the
SD-IoT controller. For the raw data, the value of data packets
received by the SD-IoT controller reaches the maximum
FIGURE 10. The bandwidth of controller-switch channels in SD-IoT.
at 10s and then gradually becomes stable. The ups and
downs that follow occur because the DDoS attack flow
and normal flow both generate packet-in messages. For the
DPPC algorithm of [30], the value of data packets received
by the SD-IoT controller becomes stable after 20s and is
high; this is similar to the raw data after 20s. Obviously,
the algorithm does not successfully detect DDoS attacks.
To summarize, the number of flow table items of the
SD-IoT switches, the number of packet-in messages from the
SD-IoT switches to the SD-IoT controller, and the number
of data packets received by the SD-IoT controller are smaller
than those of other approaches when using our algorithm. The
results indicate that our algorithm improves the performance
of IoT under DDoS attacks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we describe a general framework for SD-IoT
composed of an SD-IoT controller pool with controllers,
SD-IoT switches integrated with the IoT gateway, and ter-
minal IoT devices. Then, we propose an algorithm for
detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks with the proposed
SD-IoT framework. In the proposed algorithm, we obtain
the threshold value of the cosine similarity of the vectors
of the packet-in rate at the ports of the SD-IoT boundary
switches; we use the threshold value to determine whether
a DDoS attack has occurred, find the real DDoS attacker, and
block the DDoS attack at the source. Finally, the simulation
results show that the proposed algorithm can find the IoT
device fromwhich a DDoS attack is launched within a shorter
time period, quickly handle and mitigate the DDoS attack,
and ultimately improve the unveiled glaring vulnerabilities
in IoT, in which the terminal devices have computational and
memory requirement constraints. Future work will focus on
how to proactively defend against DDoS attacks in SD-IoT.
In addition, dynamic load-balancing algorithms in the con-
troller pool will be designed and implemented, and more effi-
cient algorithms for detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks
based on the SD-IoT framework will be investigated.
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